Mt. Vernon Democratic banner (Mount Vernon, Ohio : 1853), 1864-02-20

              t: v--j, 1 (f -iffy frT C:: 'r '3 j 1m XLOiirXfaU , -: cf tha - Eaixri Pocomest; .."3 '. - ' - ' oeiohiai, ecssmc or tus ttmjl TJf GcnenxT Letter to the Prttidmt, Secretary of Wry and Military -., v.-v GmxtaHtieTtm i -" niOTLJlSD CASPAIGNS. Um ra? of ta ?otome Voxbt aad Sow Its Saeriflees crero Zlewarded in T7as2a . laftOB. . . Oeatrsl ZSeClellaa! Tribute to Ms Sol- diert. . ; General HcCIelUa has at last, been per-rnUtod to tell hia own atory of the great eam-caiupaign ior which the alminitration has emleaTored to make hitn responsible to history aod the country. When we aay that Uiia atory proves, leyood cavil or contradiction, that for lliecampiign of 1802 General IfcCtel-Ian ta in trath responsible, only eo fr eon-cerna the salvation of aa army imperiled by the reckless and icnorant strategy of a knot Cj aelfish polilictan?. we eay what the raort paA sionate and prejidiceVl reader of theae clear and quiet and uianlv pages will find it hard to gainsay ."at iaat in the secret of li is own brain and heart. The whole atory, be it remember ed, too, ta not told, cannot possibly be told hy a commissioned general of the anny writing to the head of the Department of War, that-head being the very man whose hand has been weighing for evil upon hitn an I upon his gallant iroofM lor so many weary and worse than wastrd auMtthe. Of what still remaina to Im made known we shall her and now saynothing'.- We shall even refrain from commenting a poo the narrative wHch has been made public, and eootiue ourselves to th simple duty of stating, in a lrief synoptical form, what it is tbat Uen Mcdvliau teila as of the annals of thta mighty war. The Geaerara report, m hea we consider that ft eBiiracr toe VaWSryTVBiijTTiiiii, ft m t . . . inoniua crowoeo wnn grea evenis, is. einjrulas- i iy brief and condensed. .It takes on the story or ii si connection witn ine army at nts arrival in Washington alter the first disaster at Bull Run, and passes on through the whole period of the orgaaizalioo of the Army of the Potomac ; throngh the preparations male in the winter ot 1 HO 1-2 r the invasion of Virginia ; through the movements araiost Ricbinoml. by way of York town and the Peninsula; through ihe fler-ely rontestel battles of the aeven days ; atnl through the abort bat splendid canipai.u in Man-land, down to the surrender, try the ireneral who formed and developed and discipline.1 and tret the finest army in the repttblio, of his luitnn of eoiumai'd. on wild November night in the camp at War-renton, in Virginia. The report is dnted at New York. August 4th IMS. and ts ihtrr4 to Brigadier Gener-al Thomas. A djutant-Oeoeral United States - army. Il k accompanied by the rirjyirts of corn, div if ion nixl s.ibnrdinale couiiuanders. and by many illustrative documents, such as maps, chartr, and the like. Passing briefly 'over hi brilliantxeampaign in Western Virginia with the statement that he was preparing for a campaign in the Upfer Kanawha Valley -when he learned at Beverlv :of the dtnuter at Hull Run. General MeClellan heervee that he hud received no notification of the .movement - of the eastern arniv, and was nqt therefore prepared to co-operate with it. Late on Sunday, the' fatal 21ft of July, an ortler .-auie to him trout Washington directing him tQ move fnui E xtern Virginia, without, however, informing him of the vital fact that General Patterson had been nnalde to prevent the Junction of Johnson with Beauregard. He was preparinc to obey this blinl and tarly ordr, when on the 22d came anoth 1 er orler retuiring him to turn over hie com-mand to Gen. Rosecrans, and repair in person to Washington. Leaving specific directions as to the fortification of the most important points then held by us n Western Virginia. General. MrClel-hta on the 23d set out lor the capital, and on the 27tb assumed command of the ' Division af the Potomac.' - - ; fie foand this army to which he waa assigned the double duty of protecting: Washington, and of threatening Richmond, neither ca-paMe of threatnlng others nor protecting Itself, fhe extent of Ihe resources of the South for resistance had. been most imperfectly appreciated. andH.wa necesMary ,at once to alarm and to eacoorageflie' official minil. '"" ' Msg!. W cucnua'a scuzac or c.araiQK ia adodst(.1a0L ""' On (he 4h'of vAaguat - I8CI; the aew general, laid before. (he Presideat hia -acheme. of In thta schema it waa laid down that oar br. If not only, hope of a epeAlr iaa.1 lasting p y o oavWieing lhe diabral BopaU tiwaVi4be waisefcof JtostUHhltvrjUia met the Goveramnt..mot prove , iraprac- Crhal asads thw, task at 4mmm more )nnera-tf toora diQeaih. .inoe they rind emld-aJ oir eaamr and injurti oar awt preatWe bat hJat hOMfwJ. abroad, s ws. aiiljiB, ilv ' yV4rBfeB4lJIeeB madf he bauWfltld It lecetwf pecTasarr to fighf there; hot; la or der U caosas b itY' eampaigfi arnei VI r- g iaU, GecVfal HcClelJaa poiated ot the ia- r t..- f tI m . - puna c ti Jintiui hv MB-miiri-, ui ntriiy. (mf fmmltT, ViJ Ut&fr twaolTa. Hmhfi Cj&sr&T&iuftetX&ttepvfrfmtmM oaewof aL!5 lia Union J5t rtf tha4,re gioa-andof reiaaatl rijr?r IrCns, rem Te tmpC nance of ar. cc.Trca Jtt far r" tirwil ta la sufi win ktt ins iiaaaiawiai g7lWjrfrl. r trtJU avDl Ci"al uraraioaa arawst tha J-Jin cities ot the rr-a waa shown to bm m-iA,.)... kk upo interior liaeaj m4 u KctHrtl('ah4 Sanaa fato WealwnTexaa in cotmw-riow with T win rtirtwt ta' th terme rttd from the Pfedte tk roorli : U rbote l Hw Mexico, waa cm iaJlj,Iffabrtifttdr iu im portaoce in p(Hiiieal aa well a ia., mUTcary sense, and ft WaJ rargcata-l with lar reaching MtgaaMy that an iaitmal aJ!iar whhUrx--feo might h ffete4 vhiefc vooU .materially facilitate the reeulta of aoch a cotpUaad BiQt To effect tlieae eran4 oljecta General ilc- deJIatt etimatet woaU rrqaire an army of boat 3W.UW bmw, to b tasa diatrilMirftl : stain H'i 9TSSAS Detbasa et Washiactoa mum a MitMtw Wastani advance (Csatsckv Max Ural).. 20,MM MM Lrtas erretiMaae Bill lists aad feruus at Xotawl wssss wsw wtisssss sssississssssnnsss 33190w) With this force, acting utvfer .the control of a policy atHtry protective of orfvate property, and assrriftil to prirate eohliera taken in arms, General UcClellaa waa of the opinion that the organised strength of the rebellion might be overwhelmed ; and the populatlona of-the Sooth compelled to recognize the lutilrtr and follrof perstseing km- an attempt to resist a . . : l j : . i them t tki MtnctitDtlnKal nKIialuMi mmA I to respect its own constitntHinal limitations while performing ts constitutional duties. . At the time when these eogg-Htlon were snbmirt "d to the President the nll-ahsorldng thought of the government was the safety of Washington, No plans tor general operations were considered, and it was believed by the majority of those whose eonnsets swayed the administration that the policy of the government ought to t simply' a eoneentrstion. of foroe around the caital ainl an advance seainst the army of tLe Confederate before Richmond. COLBITtOW Or TOE 1UT tit -COCST 18A1. General MeClellan (band the army at Washington thus const itsted : IaftiBtry ...... ....... ...... ...... .M.eot Cavalry . ... 1 ,000 Artillery ....... . ...... ...... . w ...... aQ Total. . . . ". urn I i,a&o wih nine imperfect itd-iatteriM of thirty gun. This force wa- scattered through the envi-ons of the city with no general organization, and with no regard to purposes of instruction or defense. The city was detende! Ky-a lew insignificant Earthworks, and there' was nothing to prevent its being shelled .from heights within easy range which could lie occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. : The tnoraU of the army was miera Lie anil desertions were the general order of the day." OBOANISATIOX Of Til ASST. Steps were at once taken to restore order in the city of Washington. Camps of instruction nere located and filled with the new levies; fortifications were poshed forward under a sretematio rdan. -1'' '' troops in ana about Wasbington waa aa follows: : . Preteat for doty... Siek ...... In eaflasaeat..... ....13301 9&Q 1,14 ...14S.647 ... 8,404 Makiag, with absent trwp.. A jrraad total of.. liy ilia arst of BCreh, bss raised to .J... 142,0it 1843. this total had w tfi aaaao aeedT3alf erT From this number, the defenses of.Wa-h-ingtou, the jotectom of its exwiimuntcaliona. and the mam operations agaiast .Richmond, a strong and central defensive position of the enemy protected by an mY in Virginia of at least 120.0U0 men. were to be supplied. General IfcCicilan ebowa that the Army of the Potomac proper, sultseqaeutiy reached at three ditierent periods the following totals April 30 .126,581 ...I4i,8l3 . 144,84 Jum 2S JulJ 10..... ' sea Mnia "The history. .of 'le progressive orgaiiization of the army is given atletgth,' from its formation into brtgadea, to the adoption, under the direct authority of the executive, Vf the organization into army corps, of which the Uenral oltserves: " Though i was alwavs in-favor ol this orgnnisation, as an tlHL - .ft,,.t fi t did not desire to torin them until the array had been lor some little time in the fieM, in order to enable the general office first to ae: quire the requisite experience as division com-nkandeTs iu active service." He dwells alo upon- the great diffieilty ofievelofiirg "the artillery and cavalry arms to 4he state of elti- eieucy wtik-ji woiit justify iiMkmg the for- tunes of the nation iifton a grand ami trying campaign. He l-estows scial praise npon General Barr'. chief ot artillery, aud the artillery officer of the regular army, for their inestimable services in relation to this supremely important part of his great Work : and. upon the Zenl and intelligence with which the ' volunteers availed theniselvee of the instructions and example of these ofEkwve, The brigada orgaaisatioo waa effactsd August 4. 1861. iTI divisional organization was elected Cvs ilr 15, 1H61. - ' , The organization into army eorpa bv special order of Iho President. waa taadoJiarch 8, 1H02. the army not having jet taken the flel.J io a body at all. (. Of the importast organization of a general stair. General MeClellan Mate that it waa I trun ia Hetaamber. lAil by the aMHHnunent of uenerai aiarcy aa cniet oi-stau. . The history of the various hrnartmenta of the army ia then rapidly bat mlly' sketched, with detail which shows hew r vust aras the labor to he txrfttwed ia twrfectina' j thesa awd with Uue Atentiow inade of those who io - the dincharge of their dutlea in .the engineer, me.- iaeiH e-pseiany eijaali-J tbeouei vea by c&Irj vvw nJt. 4l 4 re taW4wM 7T . la;iwir" apEMt, uoaBiy w4 twm. ;rir.,r.O to: f- -k that of any a nor orthrtJbited -taie. and tbmawill.ataodgtheiaJntatotthe campaign i tae pewteaata: ai aaste with whichvarter the battles of the eeven daya, the troops, wererenWVsd lf'Uarrwba landing to ATexaadrU. leariagrbehlaJ-iheoPair man-aer of necemary boepual eiorea aad aocosa: mooauona. .! jiia - 1 Tl.remarkabla dwlpmcnh of Jhe, teh itm eJe otJeed. I to; im por- nc V VFVf raadared by tit crouaa- the reqnvet t rresliem LicV he rtt W wew -isiniaw i CMtu.- and the cpzn tBpTmnatsUaMaU.T i ueweraj icucijaa rtioalarly dwell upon the aaniiary atata of tha troops, which is declared to have been ow the who!''" better thaa cocrsa f1 libroasarl .i trm a,t t.v -.. r J?-TT". t. M SMS mumm M S-k fTVm9TmUOC 01 1 It Uional fbrosa o Vircinia Car thfuM. eAtrjgaei J striking the rebellioa at the ; hrmeu? H i showed that for the tlefence of Wasbington there wouU ba required, according to Geaet-1 ale Barnard and Barry t T"-- ' rse BaUiBMrwaasl tfee Fsti s , , - ; Mt For eraUaas agaiast the Jee. Iswer fstoaiM. ... Total eflsetbsf. ao,alrs4 The actual effective strength at his diapoaal tie turn snowea io-ue, incjuuing ail points benr.147.6UA.witB UeM gttna-ome the Itatteriea being- raw and unlit -for active service-, and the whole force beiog 00 guns less than waa eauoiatadoo all haada aa aee eaeary. ., s ... .y- " . .'. The entire force of the Union elsewhere employed waa stated by the War Department at 161,000, and the raservee, organ ixiag. at 100,-000.General MeClellan accordingly recommended a complete and vigorous concentration of all the forces not required for defensive purposes upon the active campaign in Virginia ; the War Department estimating the force of the enemv in Virginia .at not It than 150,000 men. M tJnitv In councils, the utmost vigor and energy In action, he added. are indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped as a whole and not iu detached parte." The reliels. he continued, have displayed .energy, unanimity and wisdom wor-t by t he most deeperatcr davs of. the French revolution-.; Should we do less V Were such a concentration as he proposed to la etTeeted, General McClellaa eap-eses his conviction that the rebel organization might still, by a well-planned and well executed movement, he overthrown tefore the winter should set in. ' - - While these pre rat ions were under con-sideratkm the diiaMter ' of B ill's Bluff took place. Of this General Mi-Ciellan states tint that movement of General Stone was ordered by him. as a demonstration which he thought it tosxible might induce the enemy to abandon Leeslnrg Iteing made, as.it was, cotetn-poraneously with reconuolsances in force toward Drainsville under Gen. MeCall. Gen. Stone having accomplished oo the morning of Octolter 20th all that he waa expected to accomplish. General MeCall was recalled from Drainsville to his camp at Langley. The fact that Gen. Stone'a troops were in action on the Virginia side was telegraphed to General Mela n qji i he-2 lt, and reaching the ground the next day he learned the full extent of the disaster which had followed from thin movement, and . y 4 A. BI. of the 24th had cautel the whole command to reeross the Potomac in safety. " -; : . - Appointol to the romtuand of ihe Potomac armv, ail General HcClellsia attempts to get the army actively into the fiebf In Virginia hat leen deteatol through a variety of causes enumerated by him. On the 1st of November he was appointed to the. chief command of all the forties of the Union, and at once began active operations. The theatre of the war had now extended alioot the whole circumference of the H to plan a large and sweeping eombioaiion military oiarrations. An organization of New England troops for occupying the coast line of the South on tha miiklle Atlantic, which had been suggested by General MeClellan in Se)teinher. 1X61. took shajw in January. ISG2. as an expedition under General Burn.ide dcxi.ned to thcililate the movements ot the main bdy in E-tslerii . Virginia bv an occupation of the coust line of North Carolina. General Burnj-ide being ordered when he should have seized Xewhern to Occupy and destroy the.WeMo'i and Wiming-to'i Railrorid as f r we t aa G il.Woro, ami should circumnta ncex fa vor, to push as far as Ralwigh. Wilmington being, however, hia ultimate objective point. C;tutiou about proclamation.'' was recommended, the general lie-ing urged to say as little as possible ataiot politics and the negro," ahd to state merely that the true issue for wtrfch we are fight-inx is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the general government." ' ' - At the same time letters were sent to General Ilallec.k, (appointe.1 to-the command of the Department of Missouri.) to General Biell. (in command of the Dspirtiarut Of the Ohio.) to General Sherman, (commanding in South Carolina and Georgia.) arid to General Butler, (commanding the Departntent of the Gulf.) f 1 2 . ah(-aa 1 I M . 1 1 kl- a k - 1 ..il. tL f waa cnarge-t witti tne.tutyoti relx-uiii cliAM to orler. 10 a deuart n? nt which had leen wonderfully .mim.na.tfed. . i El rnftim-i if m nmrv nrMKimnd lid urjd a. 1 - . . . f - i - " r ( Uere.1 to hoi I the State by Twified- nots and concentrate-bis force on the Mississippi, in t m General Bietl was instruct el as to the vastJ imptrtarice of the military bccupatioiv of East-1 em Kent nek y ant Tetinesee. In Keuuicky Well he wa a ivtacf the coieluet Of our po- litical affairs ia lierhrH more import mt tb-tn : that of our military operations," aud he was ', urge.1 to bear in mind 1 that we shall most r-adily supca-ess this rebellion and restore the ahthority of the government by reltgiomily res pecting the cooHtitutioutl nrhts of all. la aononlauee with the feelings and opinion of Aft T : rm . i . mm ... ft. . . we z-resKieni. - uenerai u.Cvjieiiaore.pesiei General Buell to assure t the people of. Ken-toI?y tbut their domestie institntiona will in no luatiner tie inlet fernl with ;n and; "to allow nothing Init the dictates of military necessity' io cause him to depart from the spirit of hia insfruelbns," s c ' ' u i , .-a r f la respect to Tennessee. General Bitell waa on ie red to throw the masa of hia troopfi - by rapid marches, by Cnmlerlanl or Walker's gap. on Rnoxvitle, ia order to occapy the rTt- ro.l at that jyHnt.andfel theomnionica- -m FeiwecN Ciaei.eTii irznaia sun ine aplasia-stppi.T - . - "---- A 7 General BuelT was further eottnaele.1 toavotd :wi.lening the leaeh existing laMweew haawd ihe rebeV by r cueeJesa arreats ao4 perseca I kmsof indryidwaW r I be always found". tUGenwraVU3eUaa tbat it ia the tewd-cwey of sabordiaatM to Bzajksaric4t anwtt cm raiBra1cio-'- ' fVr? , General Sheiaaaa waa.advlee that Ihofw-vorabb moment foe a aeaai 4 mm aeait 8a- vaanals had been toetvawd that, tha beat wmrrrl before fun woail be tor iaaolat vnd redaee YoHPulaadti.Bwt lh "redaction ofCharU tfm and iudefemMwabU an a4 iba great moral ad vaoure te- favaoaght for, and this waa stated tq he aa object for wbh'V General MeCIelUn1 wasaeUvely nutafrljig hia exMvhiai toaa. Geaer-tl Ilerw fonrsirae.fc.aa. to the e4taelee to ho ewewantered la re-lacing New OrleanirBr-wwJor pos-siLT artU li;itU.eUy, ta Ij.itl thantfoacW b?a.!ia to ft tan tho eatt, 4,frtielarfyr Jackfoo. a rlliaaitppl. wKh an. nltimate view as well as to the csp tar of IZaliti a'to ll openins of tl Xllaca j .The instroetlon the' taaoed;torthe-.Oenero-altwaiaed prehebif tb iatiiwaofca of CJ olaasTtaf QammH-21cUV2 ofi wUchln h iv eaoeemjcatifrt trwy fccl -th rc-wnaa aoacr iu ewncfc-rs, t,h eentroi uai-r, was coBsUered 4y hist- aeca-sajx10 mf noon Ibaaes y the, appahanaock wnktUkhv br bim t9xftnwendti the decisive blow, in eoojnaciM with all the rest of the general movenunC' n t tk ef Jiiowr. 1332: Trf.it Lino)a,: without consultation- with" General llcClcllanw assume.! comaa4 of all the ar-raies orensLred and prenaring for theae ewneral moremeMta. He Usned on that day his War Onler No. l,pwacribing thai on the 22.1 of -IJabcoary. 18C2, a general movement Of altthe Mli WHt -wtrnwrnm tvtvsrm . rat W Ultra Ota ICS ahc-iiJ, be ma)e against the inargent force. This onlerwaa fiIIowe.l four days afterlty a second order cbuimanliiig - le Army of the Potomac to occupy a point 1teulh westward of Manaases Junction." ': - ,'.Vs - .- . .it On the 6th of Februarv General MeClellan received a note front the Preleot.. reasoning with him oa, the -fhoicf, h4tad made of a route to RtAmaa,dV General tXeCleIlan rep:iei aubisunt ally, in a leUer to Secretary Stawon. reciting wnat hal leen doneith the. Arinyof the Potomac, and what -retnaiued to be done with that, and with all the Other armies of the Republic: stating hia retoctaf.ee to waste life in aaelesa battlea," ad his desire Ho strike at the heart.' aad pointing. out the military reasons for . preferrinjt )he base of the fowr Chesapeake to that of Waxhtngton for operations against the arm -entreii cbed at Uanaasa.' . - . -. For many long montha.T'Jie said. 1 1 have laltorcl to prepare the Armyof the Pototaae to play its pirt in tlie prograine ; I have ex-ertet iiivetf to phtce all t fta other nrmie in sch a condition that they. -too. could pertorm their allotmd dutiea." IAftnow." he concludes, nbat his excellency te Pret-.idnt, yon, and I. all agree in our wintjes, and that tho-te wi-he are to bring this ar to a-cae'u promptly a the . m'e-in in oarpiwer fill permit. 1 lielieve that the inr ot the people have ent're confidence in at. Let ui then look only to the great reauli lo be accomplished, and dWegard every thu'elne." The' Pres'dent. after rw ling this letter, futtiore to urge his war oi ew, : Conferences were held, the b.te of the: I iwer Chesafieake was finally selected tor the! lavement- acaiust ... . Kiclimona. an t steps wer the necessary transports, direction of the Aswtavt . r . . r . kler the exclusive Wefary of War. d been invite.1 as ! General McClel-ig the navig;iton .ing had leen done, hrd, chiel of enifi- lalcen to nm-r The Navy Department h! earlr.as-.Augnst 12. lobl, ti Ian, to take steps for pro t el ot the flower Potomac. No however, and General Bi neerM reiorte. . that it wol I be I ereotk Point i )k the 4 be iinposKilde" for the army to prevent tton ly tlie enemv of batteries at HL and then.-e down to Chopawrtinosk, no strpM to is-event the navy took vtion ot battel ieS on the Virgiuia shore, not iug w.is left but to .he euetnr- to evac- mttnosu ver so as to eompef uate. thz a aa ARCS TO Alter ttetaiiing ibe met urre taken by him i '- - . ft mm - 1 to -eenre the rnconstntet n oi ine nantmore ' 'IcClellan begins campaign Un ofTthe btn'oridLarcuTtMegtfc- .Ttncjred httPdition,of the First army corve.. under objections to the CheprdWroovement.. but alter a mil conversation agon withdrew tbm, and the plane of General MeClellan being laid by him the same day before a council of division generalu. they were by the majority ap-provel. Still, the complete secrecy necessary to their success had now- by the course of the executive been sacrificed ; anl on the sam. -8th of March the Pre-iiienl issued . two new orilers, still w.thout consulting General MeClellan, by which the situation was greatly modified: One f these eonstitnted the army into army oorps; the oiher limited the army of operations to fifty thousand men in the event of certain coot insencies; made the safety of Washington piraiiiount to all other con-stder tiiona. flxcl a d.tte for the commencement ot operations, anf rlere.l a combined land and naval asault on the Potomac lat-terie. which it was Genera McC'ellan's in-tentioa to tarn by hia stra'egio movement. - General. M.-Clellan was thus at the out set ms'le resiouiible for a great movement, all tlie essential points of wlttch he waa f.rirt.- den to control, and the President deliberately took 'ipou himself the moral respunsiiulity of all thedixasters which were to follow. The appearance of the Merrimae mo.lifie.1 th PvniiiHiilxp ntimntimi in tit rmnmit ttaot it made the York a ad not the J antes river tha 1. A1 " - ' . n line ot t He army com mu meat ions with For- iress Moitroe. but the evac.M.-iiitu of f .. see bv the enemv. which folio wel the nublici- ,r mm w r. pa. u . -1.1 .. . .i. . j j. ' . - - . mr v wr..ftr,. mwft.i-fti, - in-. the accuracy of hi- strategic calculations, and . prepare.1 the wwy lor th full euecese of his .With the hope of harasfdng their rear, and" the certainty of employing the troop uxeful y In the interval n-f.re their embarkation for tle Tf-ninaK, Genenif McCletlan onfere.! an ad rance itMi Man;tssaa. as soon aa he tewraed t hit the eueiMy wer mariu- Thia aivaace began on the 9th of March. r t . ' At that time the force of the : enetby. a re portel by the -chief of the secret service eorps, waaae followst - -. -- t at aad vie4aity-..-,.-i.0 . At L wer Oesuqaaa aad viciaitjr. Ltmrj; ...... ...... fieaaatea) Valley i0m. ..UJSoa a ut tfltk abeat 8ft field aai 30 gaas, ' "j K "striking accbiint'is gj vea by General He-' itiLi -wli. m- Lf-. ;n.t i. ., t t-;fti- 1 a strength which aiviiirfn'',-nio4. well ,ap- -.-i- . .. I nectate imtof the nujiortauce of whitm the storv of war giveavery coiapetent tuiiitary loan a fMI:i4fc S ; Whfleal Fairfkr Court itoase threed-trs a fier: ; t a ad van bad ; W dellan -Ma wformot by a telegram, from one of hbi staff that an! or-ier hai been published if the uewspiper of that dav,rsjgned bv the Presideot'4tvl relieving bim Qeueral McCleJ-lanf of the contraaaderdabaf tftha army ktni ami wieivie.1 so ooexeeutea n conrornur I It with a general cheme of oneration ton Werft (simmaiily luterftred with tt their- Very ineen- an4&l"ftCaelM of mDst JmoortJUH atep'tiil it m u1(m.i oope, wrova v toe rrTnwn. rriieratinzLwaat he had said hefore,'thai no -filing of aelf interest isr amblrwiy 'shoald varV&rVent him4 reasirv4otlagbhaV4elf toiiaawreieet 4 Oa March-13, aeonninLoixGeneI: com- man4ns armverpaacFMsuAawavor ot the rawtnaaaroamtwixsw t a lYeaidanA - renew 'awHutatar log ha-tre-Ue that aahiagtot , taigltt be ,r i-vvit mnpi,; t.i- env IfJt IUIS movement'and Gn4ral 'UClenah detaat at' length Hho- hlstory-cf ti aterxt by" which I en i-1 m iL ' f - . . .. ' Juat 1'forarth exd itloaK rmv the le. Msntf jaetiOmeml.lIcCl-'nan nd inlbnoed him I hat he had left t rrmglr Massed to ep. srat Claaker'cvisI-! .tmm-tM-mnkW' ooi gi ve it to General Fremont; ba t 1 thar he waa opposed to Coins' eox wmI "woal.1 not do atx-:-' sV few days afbsrwa Clenlcer'a divistow waa or-deeed by tha Preaidewt, to-Joiaf' General Fro-moot,aa4Gehera! UeClellan ti thoa de- Crivewofl0.000 of tlu troops wpow which he ad eswatedThe President, aoweeer; ae-adred hlnr? that no : political ta-easure ahoold again indue him "to deprive the Army of the Potomac of any more of ita force. sfc--,r'?. Oo tho firat of April General Ucaenaa. thea on his way loFortreas Monroe, earima-i ted tne troops lea to how Washington, Manassas and thr Lower Potomac, with the 8hen-andoah . Valley. 74.4iC men.r with 103 light guna,ayUirger vforce thao-hait held -the same region " darings the eventful - and perilous monthe of Jaly, August ant September, 1861. General Barry, Chief of Artillery, states that at Washington there were left 32 field piecee, with men horsea and equipment. : Tle teattmony of General Hitchcock; who reported to the President on - the 2d of April that the force left for tha (iefense of Washington waaiiaieaate, is adftfured to show, in his bwn words,' that it waa clear-that the enemy hal wo iiHaathm of re-occaavinr Manas sas Jr.net ion. and that, therefore,, no large force would be required to bold that position." - - ;;.- ''-J -': ' : ' . Tb President however on the 9th April telegraphed to General MeClellan at Fortress Monroe his fears for the capital, based m the alarming fact that the lie from Richmond to Manassas Janctioa was entirely cpen. . ':-y' ' :r".--"-; ""'. : '. ''"': ': . ; "-,.;-;: -Tlie Navy Department ia shown to have de-cbired that the Merrimae waa . netttralize.1. and tbat the naval forces could co-operate efficient! v. and !reak through between Yorktown an.! Gloncetter Pint. General MOe!Ian also shows thaf.farHi 16. 1852. he rave onlers for the intrencbtnent of Cheater Gap and ol the point at which the Mauassas Gap Railway cr'Mwea the Shenandoah. This ' was for the (Mirnosf of preventing preei elv such a movement as was made in May folfowii.g by General Jackson. TLe change made by the President in the command of the army prevented the fulfillment of. these orders. "' . TBK rtXINSCLAB CABPAIOJC The cahses of the delay in the transportation of the army are fully sketched by Geo. McCielhtH, On reaching FurtreiM Moo roe it waa found that no steps bad been taken to secure accurate topographical . iuftrmation at that point of the eneuiy'a poohioos, and of the country occupied by him. It waa also found that, in direct contradiction to statements made by the Navy Department at Washington. Flag-offii-vr. Gollxborou)(h waa ntable to do more than watch the Merrimao and her consort iu the James river. . It eon- eequenlly became necessary to reinoilel the campaign, aud General MeClellan details at length, the auees which again and again oc-cnrre.1 to proluc the same etfect disorganizing plans once arrane.l and necessitating the abandonment of projects already in pro-cesa of accomplishment. , A letter: from General Key ea to Senator 1 1 arris, of New York, is here given, which fully explains the operation of the most fatal of these caaaes, in the the sudden withdrawal by the: President Irons Gen. McDowell, scarcely a week after his ex cellency bad,- p-omieeo tbat no aucb step ebotiia oa any account, be taken. , In the same letter the opinion is emphati cally .expressed, as that or all com petes t judges, that the lines of the enemy at York-town were too strong to I e carried by assault iu the face of the ftMft which could be there assemtdei by Gen. Johnston. The President, however, April 6, . had ad- risetl General AlcCiellan to break the ene- tny'a line to Warwh-k river at once." This advice was followed a few days afterward by a letter in which the President ur.ed "action" upon General JfcClei Ian as uecessii-ry to hia (the generars)Tpopularity: irrespect- ; tvety ot any iiuiiiarv reasons tor or against. ,-To this General MeClellan replied . that he ! could not. iossildy ,be.;influeucer in regar-l to fits iitity as a ouiiMuauder by, such cousidera-tions. "---':' , . . - -.. . At this time the whole force under the orders ol General McCiell.-in for operations on ' the Peninsular amounted to 85.000 effectives, ie commanl ol Gen. Wool, being detached 1 aol independent. : I By the report of General Barnard,, it is ' shown that the approaches to Yorktown" were ! . i... e. ..! ..11 : .1. I were heavy, but many 9t tfietn the most for- t . . -... fundable guns known, fsifes the two-thinhj ,i ui t nty w.ticr imnerntrsa mi uir; guvifi oi KM lim siaalav tuM mTr AH Vl tvi t liatfaviad f ! lm a.n- - a. I . 1 i 'li A i." i v r n i . --.- n nnr ri I ww ..... . . i , - i . . - M .. v isO,. tttvugll - ner isaivniageous circnmsiancea. t ne line of ihe enemy's works." added General Barnard. ' is certainly on- of the most exten- sive known to modern times." " If we could take Yorktown or drive he enemy out of that place, the enemy line would le no longer tenable. 'It; was deemed, too hazardous Io attempt the reduction of the placed by a iinlt. : - - - . ;.'-" "-;.. " - . i; - -: v: ; "V": ; The , details ; of the siesre of Yorktown are Kiven in . the reports and -jmirnls ofBrigadier-General B.tmanl, Brigadier-General Bar-rv. ami - Brigadier General ; Fit John - Por- ter. . " . '. - - Li E-trlv in the morning of May 4. informa tion was received that the -eneiiiv--was aban doning- his works, and General MeClellan at fotice ordered hia whole available cavalry force. with four hattenea of horse artillery tfw.ler General Sioneinan. iut fsirsmt by the Williamsburg road. General Ueiuixelman. fjook- a -m a a . f . er. aoi fHtniB being moved forward to aop port- Sto.MNnaa : These were afterward fob lift ill nn !- tin illvi-lrftll- nf ITiKftHfif I'mi. li Mnavareyj wenerat -wniner. secomt iu coot-hrtn.1 of the army, wraa tliew seat to the front td take charge of the operations. 'About two milea eaat of WilliamabargUen iT m-TI T -1 t 1 t ' "J:! l-w. 1 , . I . - - , , . . i tunc wrvrmwm wmmmrnm, Mlf-: iJIIT WiniM VI I inririivn, ij rrrei mj um f.ri uai arte Ol ffttieea arreek and lkIlege creek, i Thw main wnrka wera v- large tartifieatioo 'allelt Fort Marrudav aad otwvdva other? redoahta-jtnd ef)aoiement for fiabt gttM;TheYod a thei tort were felled, ant the opea-groam4.oTottad . "Z .- 4 . Wf-flr iTi tTJ,i GeueraJ Sioaemaa.hviiig fMlntaatry, was forraw to wwm jt 4iew : the enemy ttveheck witbgreatreditJo bi troops.: until tboarri- VAl of Generai mrer witb, part of General j C-ZmW-. .:; uie-... t te it efoiwmoyemeotjQ fJieifoMid ecea- aary by the iwpssablecharaeteT of the road AaW arte kwH it Km it 1 fswr-taTr kai.t .tavtfaarawl iiNnovetmnt V Genera; tlooker'a -amn hetweeiflhreo wnd fbnre mt: neintzelman apd Seyes Trhed urn ner 'dri ring the fler-J boon. Trlyin the morning of the 5thr Ilook-J er came np. - toe weather was excessively baf during tLe tl.iy Of th 5th;' au4.''flB'-cc'naineai' VI . x ft m, w mvw. - v. -v. . , . , emy's work at 7T b'clocTc la . ihe' mornin of . t ." t :;--. ,-rr i- v " UTerV -.Cat ill enemy bein heaViTjr rciqfarcfri I attaoJ hh tanv. Hooker' Ivt SBriodH in ft. ft, .7 wut ,,vc mm mi ,v. ciic-i c un,,Miimi 1 urnni firve of hi run wert'tiieliV sTbctween 3 and 4 P. M,4hea his ammwnitiow was giv mg oof and hie K-n with it. Kearaer earn np after pushing with immenae energy through tha deep 4iio4 and deoae Joreat, Kearney drove the enemy backNjind aavedHooker,--A boot 1 P. of the 7th Gen. MeClellan. who bad remained at xorktown to move fbr-J ward the whole army received la formation for the first time, that eerioua conflict was going ow in front of Williamaburg. and that the ait nation of afiaire waa not - wholly fovoraUe, He at once pushed forward to the front, about foarteee milea, throngh a most difScult coon- try, obrtracted by troop ao.1 forager. : He reached th front about half-past 4 P. M.. an. I . took a rapid snryey of the field, lie learaed that there waa no direct communication between: the centre and the. left under Heiniaelman. and, hearing heavy . firing ia the direction of Hancock's .command, be moved the centre forward, attempted to open communication with Heintzelman, and aent Smith and Naglee to the snpport of Hancock. Before the-egeuerale reacbsd Hancock, how ever,-the latter general, finding himseircon-fronted by a superior force, had feigned a retreat, a waited their o-M-t. and then tatting upon them fiercely had driven back the whole force at the point of the bayonet, routing them atteriy, with a total loss to them of letween five Or six hundred men. b bimwlf losing bat fifty-one. For bis course at this time General Hancock roocived from General MeClellan the highest praiee hi- engagement having riven the 'Federal armv bosaesaion of tha de- ciaive point of the field. Tb total ioa -of the array i pat down at 24S28 men. '" The troops were so much exhausted by the marches aad conflict which resulted iu the victory at Williamsburg, aa to render an im-mctiate pursuit of the enemy impossible in the then condition of he country. On the 9th also. General Frauklin's divL ion. then . lauding, ha. I a most creditable af fair with the enemy under General Whiting. Ou the 10th. ha.lquart-rs were establi-hed nineteen mile trom Williamaburg. and coiu-mnuicauona establisheil between the force moving by land atd the force moving by mmtm 9 On the LSth and lCtb, Franklin, Smith aod Porter, reached White House, five toUes be yond, the roads being so bad that one train oecupit-d thirty-ts hours in paaaiag over this short dial a nee. About this time fwp provisional array carps were organised, the one under Fit John Porter, the other uuder Franklin Headquarters reached White House on th lGtb. and a permanent depot waa at ouce or- ranised there. " : tin the lShh. Headquarters and the corps of forter nuMl r rank tin moved to. rnnstall a sta tion, five milea from White House. .. On tb 20tb, more r in fell. .On the 21st the position of the troops was as follows: '" Stoneman's advance guard one mile from New Uritlfty, Franklin's corps three miles from New Bridge.- with Porter's corps in ad vancing distance in its rear: oumner s cotd on the railroad, alout three miles from the Chickahouiiuy. connecting h right with the left; Keyes' corps, on : New Rent road, near Bottom's Bridge, with Heintzelman corps at supporting oietance to- its rear. . . the ford at Bottom's Bridge: was in odr poKesaion. and the febuildiug of the bridge. which had been destroyed by the enemy was commenced. On the 22d headquarter moved to Coal Harbor. 0" the 26th the railroad was in operation as far as the Chicka hominy, and the railroad bridge across that stream nearly complete- Ou the 28th of June, as soon asNCleneral MeClellan leamcl the re ult of the battle of Gaines' Mills, he wrote his celebrated letter to Stanton. The conclusion of this letter was aa follows : . : ' I know that a few thousand rocre men would have chauge.1 the battle from a defeat to a vi-tory. As it i- the Government mnst not, and cannot, hold me responsible for the result. I fed too earnestlyt night I have seen, too many dead aid wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained the army. If yon do not do so now, the game is lost. If I tave tAit ttrmy momy, I Utl yea plainly tkat I toe a thank to sway, or 16 way other vtrmnn in W,uh.ngtn. YOU HAVB DONE YOUR BEST TO SACK I-FiCE THIS ARMY. This letter wa printel in the Report on the conduct of the war, but either the Committee or the JJectvfary suppressed ah that referred to Kim. The conclusion of the letter, a printeil there, is this : - I know that a few thousand men more would have change! this battle j from a defeat to.a victory. As it is, the govermmeiit most not and cannot hold me reeponsible for the result. I feel too earnestly I have seen too many dead an t wounded comrades; to feel otherwise than that, 1he government has not ula:ned this army. If you do hot do so now. the game is lost. V" V Tl is supp-esion is but a piece with the entire courae of conduct of the ; Adininiatratiou toward-. Gen; MeClellan. " ' TJie hi-tory of the operations before Richmond is now given in detail, with reports of subonlinate rommanders. including tha battle of Fab- OAs ami Hanover Court Hon, the paralysis of the operations eansel by" the su.lden wiifHtrawalof ,' Me Dowel Is command to protect Washington at the moment" of th iauic caiisct bv the' movements' ol Gener 1 ! v r. u, mum i Ktone wall Jack on against Brinks. Shield and : Fremont, ant th change of base to theJamf river aceomplisbetl,. through the severe and glorious actions of the .".Seven, Daya, from the Imttle Of Me-han;cville, on tt.a 28th 'of June, to th fierce' battle- of ' Mai vera nil I, Jalyl --ri.;. t ! n--i nrrin- , , m yiwm n uc wi HbyiTiiiiii, . fft4H hard, figjbtmg which had contioaed from the (. 1 . I. OC.J. t T .... l - : JT -r .ivrnww wruv nu hi wus. in -ci iviib . vi , engagement wholly unparalelled on this eon-tiaeut for Uelermiaatio and, slaughter on both J mm v- -.. .--"--. -. . ; Jal.dihtbw' Drneral telegraphed , t the Prmi iewl that he occupied-at Harri4n'lau poaitio i" wbich -eouhl -b carried, only by overwbelmiflg umhera.f u."Th spirit pf the he a)dded. i etcelleat, atraggler , are finding thei resimenta aadlheaotdiera exhibit th bet rerelie ofdisciplinc. Ue fhua sums. up the results of tb brief but fierce campaign -l -a -- a . -a cannot, awapurovtmai iony suueiuenr or oar i aases; eat w wera not jteate i aav cqnciet :XM rwewy ver anablo br their nu mW eforU drivw,M Xrom any field. vim nave mas mm gna except. venty-fi re on -a". a Mm . . a . " - - - - i - l?'0 t W which wr Jos t ? " VZ way pf JJcCaJl'e Ii vin under f hoO-neet of aatwenoruBir.'; When 11 the cirroawtaaee- of th case are known, .it wiU lb aoknowledgsd by all com petentjudjea, that ibarmattTOrnt Jmtt completed by our army b attparaleliad 4a the aanaJa otwar. Udr f!:e inoet dlTlcuTt tirerciDstAnee w baV preset iej on r trs5a3, oarytn, our tuoterial,- and above all omr hona.'f.-'-s-;T:i? &,tSz' ITo H.U f h XrisIJestTrp: V ft-? t W:7el C:Urc nfr a?.' lift ervor. iiT; cZctfr od men- u and &rvtf' will 'be, a posiUOM we abail bive ta enemy jec-, ' z Oa the 7th General McCfellaa telegrspuedt If not attacked to-day I eSn laogL at t&xa FUs OQcer Goldsboroazh icoofideot ha can keep open my communication by, UieameJ.1 zpecung an atuck however, aa a necrt Mf v tu enemy, ana reeling uc cnum bUmI of the position, General ItcClellan m th name day addressed to tb President th fal lowing letter; "'-- - J - - - - --. HtADqcAKTxu Awrr or rat Poroxc.! Camp near Uaxtison' Landing; Va-V' Joly7.l8Clr ilr. Pmiienb Tot. have been fall v intut mi,. ed that the rebel army in our front, wuh ths purpose of overwhelming m by attacking. OUT V appreciated. If you ta. boU y our 'fhzzti position or reducing us by blocking Bp oor , , river communications. I cannot but renrA our condition aa critical, and i araatly daw. " sire ia view of possible coo tin gencies, to lav. . before oar Excellency, for tout private cca4 V eratioa, my general views conceruing the aj - . isting state of toe rebellion, altaoagb tfcey ai-not strictly relate to the situation o ibi amr . or strictly com within the seen of my oSoiai . - datie. Thee views amount s to ooovlettoot and are deeply impressel upoa my mind and heart. fJor cause most never be abanrtooed mm it is the eaus of free institution and must Lej , preserved, whatever may be the cost ia timet ' treaaare and blood. If Secession i sacceastal other dissolutions are to be dearly seen in tha future. . Let neither military disaster, poluieal faction nor foreign war shake your settled par . pose to enforce the equal operation of ih utwa-of the United Suae upon the people of vry State. .-:-. ; -. : . . ; - - The lime has come when tke Government most determine apon a civil and military policy t ovvringthe whole ground of our national tro b'e. The responaibility ot detertuii t g. de daring and supporting sacb civil and mihury policy, and of directiug the whole course Ct national affairs in regard to th relllioo, V must now be assumed or exercised by you or-your ; cause .will be lost. The Coastitation give you power sufScieut evsu for tlie prearal , terrilde exigency. -- This retielliou has aaantned the character of war, as such it should be regarded, aad: H '-should be conducted upon the highest : priaci pies knowa to Christian civilization. Itshoull not be a war looking to the sul-jngntioo of tb . people of any ftate on any event. It shoukt. not be at ali a war upon population, but against - : armed forces and political organization.- Neither confiscation of property, political execution of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplate"! for a moment. Ia prosecuting the war all private property and unarmed' persons shoo hi be strictly .protected. - subject only to the necessity of military operation. All private property taken for military ate should be paid . or receipted for; pillage aad "-waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly p obibited. and '-onensie leiiieauor of the military toward eite " ers ifromp ly rebuked. Military street shot Id not be toletated except in places where acme host lilies exist, and oaths not required-by enacMiienU constitutionally made, should le neither demanded nor received. ' Military government ahoubl be oonfineil to the preser-vation of public onler and the protection of : political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the rvdatiwn-!"-3 servitude either by supporting or impairing th-authority oj the master, except for repressiig -- disorder, aa in other cases. Slaves contraband under the ad of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. Tke right Of th government to appropriate permanently to ha own service claims of slave labor shonld bo-assertel, and the right of the owner to evesV " pensation therefor should be reeognized. This principle might' be extended upo?' grounds of military necessity "and security t9 all slaves within a ptr.icnlar State, thna man--umision in such S ate; and in Missouri, per-haps in Western Virgiuia aluo, and possibly- even in Maryland, the expediency of aucb 4)-measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional amf ioneervative. and rrevaded by the jnflueneaat of Christ anlty and freedom, would receive tni support of almost all truly loyal men, would - v deeply impress the rebel masses and all (far " eign nations, and it might be hnmbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor. Of ' the Almighty. . - - Unless the principle goveriiiag th futttrty-- eoodoct of our struggle snail be made knowa-ami approve.! the ett'rt to obtain requisite for-ces will be almost hopeless.- A declanttkai t radical views, especially npon slavery, will rapilly disintegrate onr present armies. - 5 .Th policy of the government mnst be trip-parted by concentrations of military power The national forces should not he dispersed ia expetlitions, posts of ocenpntion and namerno --armies; butaholdu be. mainly collected Intai--V masses and bronght to bear hKn the armie'J of the Confederate .States. Those armies tbor-oughly defeate.1 the polieaI st rue tare whictt ' they support woo Id soon eease to extsc.---- V In carrving out aay system of policy whfctf you may Wm, you wilt require a comtTUKi V iit-chief of the e, rmy -one who possessee vowr " confidence, underBt'ad y onr views and wb kf -e competent to execnte your ortlers by direotiaf . the military force of the nation to the aaeom-pliahmeat of the oldeots by yon proposed. X cannot ak that place for myself. I ana will-., ing to serve you ta aoch pos'itieaw-yck..aaay-assign me, and I will do so as faithfoilj a.--ver snhorliaate aerred aoperior. f .- . m.mww T w . mmm ' I oay be on toe brink of eteraityi and. aa X hope forgivenesa frO'n inv JXker. J Jva writ' ten thia letter with eioftarity toward yu.ad from love for my country. Very rs-peot fully ymr obe-Iieat aereaaVc?-, . Oa the nth- GneraT ItIellao terab We are yt-yjtrqng here mtw 6 fcr aft tti" Teoe is conct-rned , "Isj jbn soon rack' v' ns vl roog enongh to adfaoe asd try li r An tilritW- V Fr m thia date, to 4hit SCXhl gtwtait ir peals for aufficicntjorelo aseumr U.rB-sive were jnad by GeheralcCtelfaa; to. th ' rmMent-ia,t e"lIa t aight orAasfmjt; f.'n Kf.sm'ft xS VfieuTy,- wblf ary illety; eir. U.4 'Sooth "Lank Jame ra eignlly rpolel; -- -- ' : On tLe aajfr trtrehlmil -C-"fif :fII--egrabhed h rejoft froi General Top thai the" earrriy'wfTe-vctaiiing nichinOtid.tD44er. dered Geberal KcCtellsn fo -iy ?hMJ stckTCA orderrhich trti tnfrrretd" ty HJlat'" Genera to la-lie'tfajlioc for- Li minthbfJebsfve.v- v - " r . On th 4th General iTSaJcer defeated ti r?W- i l-emr mf eewpiod Z" ' Uilt, aotTth? sc 'si ; day. General t.iCT. ra p5 eJ f "Z r 7t ".. troOp nav a-vamifti.. . ti fit -ncv-:-tioa and 17 1'.' -v to-rlX.:;-. Th tit ,Uf ci;xi i:-. Ti-r! -'": '.. I bve c? reiBfoTcemtntjita-tavt kiremAjr thrct days Uterf . order for tbecu4'Jao tt He... . t tnTmiwKi tu iuih w w-. - , 4 Dova to this data General iltCT. :;n tee left in IjorariR of tbelrJte-!:: jLverti'ment. II "hs.! T ... . - .-....' . i- . e.. w - . ainss lotnciumi, aa aoca sa l . , aa certain U prov zzl?c-i Hi 'J- - .' -V v.- - - -". --. - -A -